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This paper analyzes the power balance between parties’ central – and public offices by examining 
the characteristics of their staff. While earlier studies have analyzed the intra-party power balance 
by comparing staff sizes, I argue that the qualifications of staffers shape the everyday interactions 
between party faces. More specifically, public offices are better able to evade control by extra-
parliamentary party organizations when their staffers are more experienced and less responsive to 
partisan loyalty. The empirical section is based on a cross-sectional analysis of original survey data 
collected among political staffers in Belgium and the Netherlands (N=1009). The result show that 
parties’ public offices do indeed have a qualitative staffing advantage, as their staffers are more 
experienced and more motivated by career prospects and political influence. This advantage is 
mostly driven by the high presence of policy experts and political assistants within the ‘public face of 
the party’. However, several contrasts between Belgium and the Netherlands demonstrate how the 
distribution of parties’ human resources depends institutional factors. While parliamentary offices 
consistently dominate Dutch parties, the existence of extensive ministerial offices in Belgium 
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The impact of professionalization on the internal power balance of parties lies at the heart of 
influential party models (Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995). The growing presence of political 
professionals is often seen as an organizational game changer, empowering elected elites in 
parliament and government. According to Katz and Mair’s description of ‘the ascendancy of the party 
in public office’ (2002), the shift in parties’ resources inevitably affects their internal power relations. 
More specifically, the dominance of the party in public office brings along the ‘subordination of the 
other two faces’, namely the party on the ground (members and activists) and the party in central 
office (national headquarters) (Katz and Mair, 2002). While earlier research suggests that parties’ 
public offices have a quantitative staffing advantage (Krouwel, 2012; Kölln, 2015; Bardi et al., 
2017), this paper examines also enjoy a qualitative staffing advantage. I argue that public offices 
have not only gained the upper hand by hiring more staff than central offices – they also hire 
different types of staffers. Building on the seminal work of Panebianco (1988), I hypothesize that 
public offices include more ‘professional’ staffers. Because of their high degree of expertise and 
their lower focus on partisan loyalty, these professional staffers experience little interference or 
monitoring from parties’ central offices. As such, the qualitative staffing advantage loosens the grip 
of the extra-parliamentary party organizations on its elites in public offices – both elected and 
unelected.    
 
The empirical analysis is based on original survey data collected among the staff of 14 Belgian and 
Dutch parties (N=1009). As no detailed longitudinal data on staffers’ qualifications is available, I 
present a cross-sectional analysis of the current internal distribution of parties’ human resources. 
Firstly, I build on existing studies by examining the quantitative advantage of parties’ public faces. 
Are the parliamentary – and ministerial offices indeed supported by the larger staffs than the party 
in central office (RQ1)? Secondly, I focus on qualitative indicators for political professionalism by 
examining three key characteristics discussed in Panebianco’s seminal work (1988): staffers’ 
organizational role, their expertise and their professional ethos. Are staffers with strategic tasks, 
experience outside politics and careerist motivations indeed more prevalent within the parties’ 
public offices (RQ2)? Thirdly, I examine the impact of institutional factors on the distribution of 
human resources. Do parties’ public offices similarly benefit from a qualitative staffing advantage 
in Belgium and the Netherlands (RQ3)? 
 
This paper makes several innovative contributions to existing literature. Firstly, it offers an in-depth 




and Keith, 2017). Although research on political staffers is considered particularly troublesome 
(Webb and Kolodny, 2006), a diverse selection of parties cooperated – resulting in a satisfying 
response rate of 34%. Secondly, the characteristics of staffers working within different institutional 
settings (central office, parliament, government) are compared for the first time. Instead of 
focusing  on a specific subgroup (e.g. ministerial advisors), I approach political staffers as a unified 
group of actors spread across different organizational entities. Thirdly, this research design enables 
an original, direct assessment of a key assumption behind the often recited ‘ascendancy of the party in 
public office’ (Katz and Mair, 2002).  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I explain how I interpret central concepts such as political 
staff, staffers’ individual tasks and the three faces of political parties. Second, the impact of staffers’ 
qualifications on the intra-party power balance are discussed in detail to develop three hypotheses. 
After describing data collection and the operationalization of variables, I consider the findings and 
their implications.  
Conceptualizing political staff 
This paper defines political staffers as individuals with a remunerated, unelected position that have 
been politically recruited within a party’s central office, parliamentary party group or ministerial 
office. In this section, I explain the empirical implications of this definition and discuss how they 
can be divided into separate groups based on their individual tasks and the party face in which they 
work.  
Political staffers have several characteristics that set them apart from other actors involved in party 
politics. For example, their relationship to party politics is fundamentally different from voluntary 
activists because staffers receive a salary in return for their efforts. Neither is their position 
comparable to elected elites, as staffers are not elected but get recruited by a political party or office-
holder. Their position also contrasts with civil servants, even when the civil service is subject to 
politicization. In contrast to state officials, the positions of political staffers are in parliaments or 
ministerial offices not permanent.  They are an integral part of the spoils of office and remain tied 
to the positions of elected elites, which are up for grabs with every cycle of parliamentary elections 
and government formation. Lastly, staffers work directly for parties, parliaments of ministerial 








The individual tasks of political staffers include professional activities that can be grouped into six 
categories (Figure 1). Managers ensure that the political machine runs smoothly. As central 
figureheads, they are responsible for translating a party’s political-strategic goals into an effective 
political operation. In this role, they often coordinate with elected elites and monitor the activities 
of other staffers as people managers. Policy experts provide elected elites with tailored policy advice 
by drafting legislative documents and writing briefings (Maley, 2000; Busby and Belkacem, 2013; 
Gouglas et al., 2015; Pittoors et al., 2017; Wolfs and De Winter, 2017). In ministerial offices, they 
often coordinate with policy experts from other coalition parties (Maley, 2011; Askim et al., 2018) 
and civil servants (Askim et al., 2017; Connaughton, 2015). Communication experts help elected 
elites to connect with voters effectively in a mediatized political environment. They run electoral 
campaigns and promote the (social) media presence of elected elites on a daily basis (Askim et al., 
2017; Dommett et al., 2020; Sabag Ben-Porat and Lehman-Wilzig, 2020).  
 
Managers Director (central office, ministerial office), party group secretary, head of general 
policy (ministerial office), cabinet secretary (ministerial office) 
Policy experts Policy advice (party study service, party group or ministerial office) 
Communication 
experts 
Director of communications, communication cell staff, spokesperson (party 
leader, party group or minister), internal party communication staff, translator, 
public relations staff 
Political assistants Personal assistant (party leader, MP or minister), parliamentary liaison 
(ministerial office) 
Party organizers Coach of local sections/campaigns (central office), experts in local policy 
(central office), assistants to party subgroups (youth, women, elderly, ...)  
Administration  
& support 
Finance and accounting, human resources, IT, reception, administration, 
catering (central office or ministerial office), personal driver (party leader, 
minister) 
Table 1: Staffers’ individual tasks 
 
Political assistants are the main sidekick for many individual politicians as they manage the practical, 
daily routines of holding an elected office. In this role, they act as gatekeepers to elected elites by 
managing their daily schedule (Busby and Belkacem, 2013) and organizing constituency services 
(Landgrave and Weller, 2020). Party organizers support the party on the ground as the available 
pool of volunteers to run the party on the ground becomes increasingly limited (Scarrow, 2014; 
Van Biezen et al., 2012). In this role, they support local office-holders, candidates and party 




collective support structure of a specific party, party group or ministerial office and contribute to 
bureaucratic routines or provide operational services to guests, personnel and elected elites.  
Party faces 
 
Political staffers work within several subunits of parties, including parliamentary party groups, 
ministerial offices,  local or regional offices and party headquarters. To categorize these different 
settings, this paper builds on Katz and Mair’s (1993) seminal conceptualization of the three party 
faces, distinguishing between the party in public office (parliament and government), the party on the 
ground (members and activists) and the party in central office (national party organization). More 
specifically, I focus on staffers in parties’ central and public offices to assess the power balance 
between both faces. To my knowledge, it is the first time a study on political staff covers those 
working at party headquarters, parliamentary offices and ministerial offices. In contrast, existing 
empirical research on staff is scattered across disciplines interested in particular party faces. As a 
result, these earlier studies do not consider political staffers as unified group, only covering specific 
subgroups of staffers. Firstly, legislative scholars have focused on staffers’ impact on political 
representation, most notably the US congress (Patterson, 1970; DeGregorio, 1988; Salisbury and 
Shepsle, 1981; McCrain, 2018; Hertel-Fernandez et al., 2018) and the European parliament (Busby 
and Belkacem, 2013; Pegan, 2017). Secondly, public administration scholars have focused on the 
policy advice of ministerial advisors (Maley, 2000; Brans, 2017) and the (dys)functions of ministerial 
offices, particularly in relation to civil servants (Connaughton, 2015). More recently, attention to 
the partisan loyalties of ministerial advisors has been reinvigorated (Hustedt and Salomonsen, 2014; 
Askim et al., 2018; Christiansen et al., 2016) by increasing politicization in Westminster countries 
(Shaw and Eichbaum, 2018; Gouglas and Brans, 2017). The few inroads into the subject by party 
politics scholars remain limited to staffers in central – and parliamentary offices, neglecting the role 
of ministerial staff (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017).  
 
Although this paper positions itself within the field of party politics, I argue that ministerial offices 
should be considered an integral part of a party’s human resources. While parties often only directly 
pay central office staffers (Webb and Kolodny, 2006), a party’s human capital clearly extends 
beyond its own headquarters. Although the salary of elites in parliament and government originates 
from the state, parties are nonetheless indirectly responsible for their compensation because they 
are the principal recruitment channel for such positions (Schlesinger, 1984; Jun and Bukow, 2020). 
As pointed out by Katz and Mair (1993), “the resources of the party in public office may not be visible in pure 




staff are appointed to positions in the public, as opposed to the party, bureaucracy” (Katz and Mair, 1993: 606). 
For these reasons, ministerial offices cannot be overlooked in an analysis of parties’ internal 
distribution of human resources. As a result, government status has considerable implications for 
a party’s human capital in political systems where ministerial positions include a group of politically 
recruited advisors (Bolleyer, 2009; Wilson, 2020).  
Professionalization and power 
Ever since Ostrogorski (1902) and Michels’ (1915) seminal work on political parties, the link 
between organization and power has been a focal point for party scholars. Similarly, the impact of 
professionalization on the internal power balance of parties lies at the heart of influential party 
models such as the electoral-professional party (Panebianco, 1988) and the cartel party (Katz and 
Mair, 1995). The growing presence of political professionals is seen as an organizational game 
changer, empowering certain actors within political parties at the expense of others. More 
specifically, Katz and Mair (1993) have argued that the influx of paid staffers has mostly benefitted 
the party in public office, which gained importance over both the party in central office and the 
party on the ground. Subsequent empirical analyses illustrated how staff growth within 
parliamentary offices has outpaced central offices in most Western European nations (Kölln, 2015; 
Krouwel, 2012; Bardi et al., 2017). These studies demonstrate that professionalization has indeed 
produced a quantitative shift of staff resources as parties’ public offices are supported by larger 
staffs than parties’ central offices.  
 
However, the concept of professionalization goes well beyond a mere increase in staff resources. 
Panebianco (1988) described how traditional party bureaucrats were gradually being replaced by a 
new type of staffers: political professionals. Parties’ demand for new types of staffers is rooted in 
several environmental challenges that arose during the second half of the 20th century. In the 
electoral arena, parties faced increased competition from centripetal competition (Kircheimer, 
1966) and challenger parties (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020), resulting in electoral volatility 
(Drummond, 2006). At the same time, the emergence of mass media (and later: social media) 
provided new opportunities to connect with voters. As a result, parties recruited communication 
experts to navigate new technological developments and strengthen their position towards media 
outlets in this permanent campaign environment (Blumenthal, 1980). In the policy arena, parties 
faced increasing complexity because of the expansion of the welfare state and the growing 
importance of multi-level governance (Marks et al., 1996). At the same time, parties became 




tanks (Stone et al., 1998) seeking to shape policies. As a result, parties recruited policy experts to 
navigate the increasingly complex and technical nature of policy-making.  
 
Building on Panebianco (1988) and Katz and Mair (2002), I argue that the influx of these political 
professionals puts the party in public office at a double advantage. Parties’ public offices do not 
only have larger staffs, their attractiveness to qualified professionals reinforces its primacy over 
other party faces. The causal mechanism driving this process is visualized in Figure 1, which 
connects Panebianco’s conceptualization of professionalism (1988) to the uneven distribution of 
resources described by Katz and Mair (1993). In response to the challenges in the electoral – and 
policy arena discussed above, elected elites attract in-house expertise by hiring strategic advisors. 
These political professionals share several important characteristics that set them apart from other 
staff, of which three are analyzed in this paper: their tasks, expertise and vocational motivations. 
As shown in Figure 1, my interpretation of professionalization theory is that the particular demand 
for political-strategic advisors in parties’ public offices attracts qualified candidates who bring their 
own professional experience and – motivations to the table. In effect, this results in a qualitative 




Figure 1: Causal mechanism driving public office advantage 
 
The first defining characteristic of political professionals are their tasks. Drawing from private 
sector terminology, Panebianco (1988) distinguished between the different assignments linked to 
line – and staff roles. On the one hand, traditional party bureaucrats exemplified the line role in 
politics by supporting the party machine as administrative clerks with operational duties. On the 
other hand, political professionals take on advice-oriented staff roles, supporting elected officials 




political impact of professional staff by conceptualizing staffers’ roles as a distinction between 
technical – and strategic assistance. “Strategy assistance refers to involvement in essentially political decisions, 
such as the development and implementation of policy and campaign strategy. Technical assistance includes 
administrative functions and services, such as website design or maintaining membership files” (Karlsen and Saglie, 
2017: 4). It follows that such strategic, advice-oriented positions are centered around the most 
visible elected elites representing the party in parliament or government. 
H1: Policy – and communication experts are more prevalent within the party in 
public office.  
 
The second defining characteristic of political professionals is their expertise. For Panebianco 
(1988), professionalization is about the introduction of extra-political knowledge and experience 
into the realm of politics. The added value of a communication advisor is the strongest when it is 
based on earlier professional experience as a marketeer, pollster or social media analyst. Policy 
experts are the most valuable when they have specialized within a specific policy domain in an 
earlier position in academia, business or the civil service. For Katz and Mair (2009) however, 
professionalization has established politics as a separate occupational track. Indeed, it seems 
reasonable that parties and elected elites will also value advisors who have pursued a specialized 
career in politics. Such seasoned advisors bring along a particular kind of political craftsmanship, 
based on their experience with past political cycles and crises.  
H2: Highly experienced staffers are more prevalent within the party in public office.  
 
The third defining characteristic of political professionals is their vocational ethos. Whereas 
Michels (1915) once described traditional party bureaucrats as employees who completely identify 
with a party’s political ideas, professionals supposedly lack such strong partisanship. Instead, 
Panebianco (1988) argues that they temporarily venture into politics to seek career advancement, 
expanding their own professional experience and – network (Askim et al., 2020). Similarly, Katz 
and Mair (2009) state that professional staffers prioritize their employment contract over loyalty or 
ideology. In a rare empirical study of party staffers, however, Fisher and Webb (2003) find that 
most are moved by both rational career incentives and altruistic partisan motives. More recently, 
research by Svallfors (2017) argues that above all, political professionals seek to influence political 
decision-making without taking the spotlight. Compared to the party staffers at central offices, I 
anticipate that public office staff is nonetheless more receptive to influence – and career motives 
because their advisory role within public institutions (parliament, government) is further removed 
from the party’s organizational core. Vice versa, those who are strongly driven by partisan motives 




H3: Staffers driven by influence – and career motives are more prevalent within the 
party in public office.  
 
How does this all affect the internal power distribution of parties? If public office staffers are 
indeed more qualified than their counterparts in central offices, this reduces the capacity of a party’s 
extra-parliamentary organization to control its staffers in public offices. These control mechanisms 
matter because the party in central office acts is the official mouthpiece for a party’s membership 
base. However, Panebianco (1988) states that the specific characteristics of political professionals 
make them harder to control. Indeed, both professional expertise and vocational motivations could 
have this effect in my opinion. Knowledge is power: staffers with extensive experience have an 
informational advantage over others due to information-asymmetry. Moreover, staffers with extra-
political expertise balance their partisan loyalty with the judgement of their peers outside politics. 
Panebianco (1988) uses the example of a formally-trained expert in economic policy, aiming to 
uphold a reputation among fellow economists in other sectors. The issue of professional credibility 
is especially pertinent among staffers motivated by careerism instead of partisanship, who often 
see their position as a stepping stone towards more lucrative positions outside of politics (Askim 
et al., 2020). This informational advantage and their professional links outside to other sectors 
make political professionals more independent from interference by both fellow staffers and 
elected elites.  
 
Data and method 
This study examines staffers from Belgium and the Netherlands. From an international perspective, 
both countries share many similarities. Both are historically divided societies which have overcome 
societal cleavages through consociationalism and power-sharing (Deschouwer, 2009; Andeweg and 
Irwin, 2009). Their highly proportional electoral systems have produced extensive, complex party 
systems that require cooperation through coalition government. In both countries, this institutional 
context has created collective staff infrastructures centered around parties, who predominantly 
recruit their staff within their own network (Moens, 2020). However, several important differences 
between their institutional settings have important implications for staffing. Firstly, the resources 
of Belgian parties far exceed those of their Dutch counterparts. While the dependence of Dutch 
parties on state resources remains limited, Belgian parties brazenly tap into the state for financial 
and human resources (Van Biezen and Kopecký, 2014). This remarkable contrast is illustrated by 




party, the VVD led by prime minister Mark Rutte included about as much staffers as Ecolo, the 
ninth largest party represented in the Belgian parliament. Moreover, this contrast is exacerbated by  
fundamental differences in the support structure for government ministers. Whereas Dutch 
ministers are assisted by a handful of political staffers, their Belgian counterparts are supported by 
extensive ‘ministerial cabinets’ comprised of dozens of partisan advisors (Brans et al., 2006). 
Secondly, Belgian staffers are diffused across several levels of government because of federalism. 
Whereas Dutch parties include one national party group with elected officials, Belgian political 
elites are spread along several regional and federal entities. Thirdly, the gravitational center of 
Belgian – and Dutch party organizations lies within party faces. Whereas central offices are 
considered as the central power houses within the Belgian ‘partitocracy’ (Deschouwer et al., 1996), 
parliamentary party groups dominate parties within the Dutch ‘fractiocracy’ (Andeweg, 2000; 
Koole, 1992). Although some have suggested a gradual erosion of the dominance of party groups 
in the Netherlands (Koole, 2018), the subordination of Belgian party groups to central offices and 





Original survey data were collected among the paid staff of fourteen parties (Appendix A). Since 
the support of party leadership was indispensable for contacting the target population, face-to-face 
interviews with senior party management were set up to gain an official endorsement. Although 
parties are often reluctant to provide access to their personnel (Webb and Kolodny, 2006; Webb 
and Keith, 2017), this approach resulted in the participation of 14 out of 25 parties represented in 
the Belgian and Dutch parliaments. Apart from the radical right family (which refused to 
participate), these cases mirror the diversity of the party landscape in electoral size, organizational 
resources and ideological outlook. Before launching the online survey, a carefully-developed 
questionnaire was tested among party staffers during 33 face-to-face interviews.  
 
Designed to be completed in under 15 minutes, the questionnaire contained general background 
questions on staffers' sociodemographic characteristics, day-to-day professional activities and 
previous professional experiences, but also gauged their political attitudes, future ambitions and 
their interactions with peers and elected elites. Between December 2018 and January 2020, the 
complete population of staffers from the participating parties received a digital invitation to answer 
this online questionnaire, followed up by two reminders. Out of a population of 2936 individuals, 




representativeness of our findings, participating parties provided population data. Based on the 
weighted cases approach (Parke, 2012), X2-tests were run to test under – or overrepresentation 
among specific subgroups within the sample. Post-stratification weights were calculated based on 
five indicators with significant differences between sample and population (country, party system, 
party, party face and age).  
Variables 
 
Staffers professional experience was measured through 6-point Likert scales‡ surveying their prior 
experience in a given field, e.g. the public sector. The questionnaire also included 12 statements on 
staffers’ vocational motivation based on earlier research among this unelected elite (Fisher and 
Webb, 2003; Svallfors, 2017). A principal component analysis identified three underlying factors, 
which were consequently labeled as partisanship (political incentives), influence (power incentives) 
and careerism (professional incentives). All statements, factor loadings and the direction of the 
relationship (positive/negative) are listed in Table 2.  
 
 
Factor 1: Partisanship  
   As a political staffer, I can work with like-minded colleagues.    0,72 
   Thanks to my occupation, I contribute to the success of the party.   0,70 
   Thanks to my occupation, I contribute to the working of our democracy. 
 
  0,68 
Factor 2: Influence  
   As a political staffer, I am closely involved in important political decision-making.   0,55 
   As a political staffer, I can be involved in politics without taking the spotlight myself.   0,51 
   Working for a political party is more satisfying than working elsewhere. 
 
- 0,59 
Factor 3: Careerism  
   A position as a political staffer is good for my career.   0,68 
   For the same efforts, I could earn a higher salary elsewhere. - 0,64 
   A position as a political staffer is a good preparation for becoming a politician.   0,42 
 
Table 2: Factor analysis of staffers’ vocational motivations 
 
For each country, three multiple logistic regression models were estimated, explaining which types 
of staffers are more prevalent within central – , parliamentary – and   ministerial offices. More 
specifically, these models show how staffers’ with certain professional experience and motivations 
are more likely to work in specific party faces (dependent variable). Sex and level of education were 
                                                          
‡ 1 = no experience, 2 = a few months, 3 = several years, 4 = more than 5 years, 5 = more than 10 years, 6 = more 




added as control variables, as staffers’ relationship to parties is gendered (Taflaga and Kerby, 2019; 
Snagovsky and Kerby, 2018; Calcagno and Montgomery, 2020; Erikson and Verge, 2020) and 
younger, less-experienced staff cohorts have higher levels of education due to the democratization 
of education§.  
 
Results 
The starting point of the empirical analysis is the internal distribution of staff resources within 
parties (RQ1). Similar to earlier studies, staffers are not spread equally across party faces in Belgium 
and the Netherlands either. However, this internal organizational balance is strongly related to 
institutional factors and government participation (Figure 2). Firstly, parliamentary resources are 
considerably lower in Belgium. This is clearly illustrated by comparing opposition parties in both 
systems. While the staff of Belgian opposition parties is divided equally between central offices and 
parliament, parliamentary staffers dominate Dutch opposition parties.  
 
 
Figure 2: Quantitative staff distribution 
 
Secondly, government participation dramatically alters a party’s human resources in Belgium**, 
whereas government status only has a marginal impact on staff resources in the Netherlands. In 
the Dutch case, the parliamentary party remains the organizational center with the largest staff 
                                                          
§ Age could not be included as a control variable due to its strong correlation to professional experience, one of the 
main independent variables. 
** On average, governing parties have a larger vote share and parliamentary party group than opposition parties. For 




when a party joins a government. In the Belgian case, however, joining government comes with 
the spoils of the so-called “cabinets”: extensive ministerial offices that include dozens of political 
staffers. These findings mostly align with the conventional wisdom that parties’ public offices enjoy 
a quantitative staffing advantage – with one remarkable exception: Belgian opposition parties. In 
this case, staff sizes are equally split between the ‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in public 
office’. If one takes into account that parliamentary staffers in these parties do not form a unified 
group because they are spread across at least three parliamentary institutions (federal and regional 
parliaments), it is plausible that central offices remain dominant in Belgian opposition parties. 
While this observation aligns with the ‘partitocractic’ features of the Belgian political system, the 
staff distribution in Belgian governing parties does not. In those cases, the quantitative staffing 
advantage of the ‘party in public office’ is irrefutable.  
 
The balance between party faces is about more than the quantitative staff distribution. The central 
claim of this paper is that the ‘party in public office’ also has a qualitative staffing advantage. Central 
offices, parliaments and ministerial offices are distinct professional habitats and their staffers have 
diverging backgrounds. To fully appreciate the staffing advantage of the ‘party in public office’, I 
examine whether the more highly qualified staffers are indeed concentrated within parties’ public 
offices (RQ2). A regression model for each party face (central office, parliament and ministerial 
office) was estimated in Belgium and the Netherlands.  
 
The multivariate analysis shows that staffers from different party faces do indeed bring different 
professional experiences and – attitudes to the table. The first two models (central office) uncover 
several contrasts between staffers from the ‘party in central office’ and the ‘party in public office’. 
Firstly, central office staffers have less professional experience in politics. In Belgium, they are also 
significantly less experienced within the public sector than their counterparts in parliamentary – 
and ministerial offices. Secondly, they are significantly less driven by careerist interests and the 
desire to exert influence. While this attitude translates into a higher degree of partisanship among 
central office staffers in Belgium, this is not the case in the Netherlands. Lastly, Dutch central office 
staffers are significantly less likely to hold a college degree than their counterparts from public 
offices. Despite several contrasts with their colleagues at central offices, however, the staff of the 
‘party in public office’ is far from homogeneous. Firstly, the models show how the vocational 
motivations of parliamentary – and ministerial staff diverge. On the one hand, parliamentary 
staffers stand out for their careerism incentives – a characteristic that is not shared by their peers 
in ministerial offices. On the other hand, ministerial staffers stand out for their lower 




Table 2: Understanding the internal distribution of staffers’ qualifications 
 CENTRAL OFFICE PARLIAMENT MINISTERIAL OFFICE  
   Belgium    Netherlands   Belgium   Netherlands   Belgium    Netherlands 
 
Professional experience 
      
   Politics   0,56 (0,27) *     0,15 (0,99) °   1,40 (0,23)   2,95 (0,83)   1,11 (0,21)     2,15 (2,08) 
   Public sector 0,16 (0,41) ***  2,51 (0,97) 0,33 (0,30) ***   0,23 (0,97)  5,65 (0,26) ***    14,98 (2,47) 
   Private sector  
 
  0,71 (0,36) 
 
 0,22 (1,11) 
 
  1,03 (0,32) 
 
  1,78 (0,95) 
 
  1,24 (0,28) 
 
    3,39 (2,02) 
 
Vocational motivation       
   Careerism  0,82 (0,05) ***     0,74 (0,14) *   1,08 (0,05) °      1,33 (0,14) *   1,07 (0,04)      0,81 (0,50) 
   Partisanship 1,35 (0,06) ***  1,11 (0,20)   1,01 (0,05)        1,16 (0,19) 0,82 (0,05) ***         0,27 (0,59) * 
   Influence 
 
0,73 (0,06) *** 
 
     0,56 (0,22) ** 
 
  1,05 (0,05) 
 
     1,58 (0,20) * 
 
1,18 (0,05) *** 
 
     1,05 (0,63) 
 
Controls        
   Education (Ref. cat. No higher education)       
      Higher, non-college education   1,07 (0,36)   0,41 (1,00) 2,82 (0,40) **   2,53 (0,98)    0,50 (0,31) * 19,07 (10996) 
      College degree 
 
  0,86 (0,32) 
 
      0,10 (0,90) ** 
 
2,97 (0,37) ** 
 
     5,55 (0,85) * 
 




   Age 
 
  1,00 (0,01) 
 
  1,01 (0,03) 
 
  0,99 (0,01) 
 
  1,01 (0,03) 
 
   1,01 (0,01) 
 
    1,02 (0,07) 
 
   Sex (Ref. cat. Male)       
       Female 
 
  1,12 (0,20) 
 
  1,00 (0,54) 
 
  0,91 (0,18) 
 
  1,51 (0,51) 
 
   0,98 (0,16) 
 
    0,23 (1,84) 
 
Constant   1,42 (1,11) 1809,47 (3,33) * 0,05 (1,01) ** 0,00 (3,46) **    0,99 (0,89)   0,00 (8029,9) 
Nagelkerke R2        0,21 0,38        0,09   0,32         0,19 0,54 
N 
 




       733 
 
  136 
 








Why are public office staffers more experienced but less motivated by partisanship? In the theory 
section, I have argued that the qualitative staffing advantage of parties’ public offices is caused by 
a high presence staffers with specific skills and attitudes. To test the validity of this causal 
mechanism, two assumptions will be examined in more detail. Firstly, the assumption that some 
staffers have distinct experiences and motivations will be analyzed based on 6 logistic regression 
models explaining the individual qualifications of staffers. Secondly, the assumption that some 
staffers are overrepresented within specific will be examined based on bivariate data showing the 
qualitative staff distribution within parties. 
 
The multivariate analysis shown in Table 2 demonstrates how staffers’ individual qualifications are 
strongly connected to their tasks. On the professional side of the spectrum, staffers are harder to 
control due to high levels of professional experience lower responsiveness to partisanship. In 
particular, policy experts appear the most professionalized, as they are highly educated, experienced 
and motivated by exerting influence. Political assistants have similar characteristics. Although they 
are often young and unexperienced, these newcomers are significantly more motivated by future 
career prospects and political influence. On the traditional bureaucratic side of the spectrum, party 
organizers resemble traditional bureaucrats most closely, as they combine low levels of experience 
and careerism with a high degree of partisanship. While the lower-educated administration and 
support staff also leans towards this category, they do not share the strong partisan loyalty of party 
activists. However, other staffers are harder to characterize. As the leading figures within the 
hierarchy, managers hold a particularly ambiguous position as they combine a high degree of 
political experience with partisan motivations. Communication experts remain somewhat 
enigmatic, as they do not stand out for any kind of professional experience or motivation. Similar 
to the majority of staffers, they have limited external professional experience and are largely 
motivated by partisanship.  
 
The qualitative staff distribution between party faces shows that the link between staffers’ tasks 
and their experiences and motivations affects parties’ internal balance. As expected, those staffers 
who are least susceptible to control (policy experts, political assistants) are indeed overrepresented 
within the public face of the party. Figure 2 illustrates the weight of specific types of staffers within 
the party as a whole. For example, parliamentary assistants are the largest group of staffers within 
Belgian opposition as they account for 24% of the total staff of these parties. While parliamentary 
offices include more policy experts than central offices, the opposite is true when communication 




Table 3: Understanding the individual qualifications of staffers 
      Manager 
  Policy  
  expert 
Communication 
expert 
  Political  






Professional experience      
 
   Public sector     0,55 (0,37)  2,60 (0,23) *** 0,62 (0,35)   0,57 (0,32) °  0,13 (0,82) *        1,10 (0,34) 
   Private sector      1,05 (0,41)  1,08 (0,29) 1,29 (0,36)   0,81 (0,37)  0,37 (0,63)        1,11 (0,36) 
   Political experience 
 
1,74 (0,31) ° 
 




  0,84 (0,27) 
 
 0,47 (0,45) ° 
 
       1,21 (0,32) 
 
Vocational motivation       
   Partisanship     1,18 (0,09) °  1,02 (0,05) 1,08 (0,06)   0,93 (0,17)   1,24 (0,09) *     0,82 (0,07) ** 
   Influence     1,11 (0,08)  1,21 (0,05) *** 0,94 (0,06)   1,11 (0,06) ° 0,78 (0,09) **       0,61 (0,08) *** 
   Careerism 
 
    0,90 (0,07) 
 




 1,18 (0,05) *** 
 
 0,79 (0,07) *** 
 
       1,07 (0,07) 
 
Control variables 
   Age (Ref. cat. 15-35)       
      36-50   3,58 (0,45) **  1,09 (0,21) 0,67 (0,28)   0,68 (0,11) 0,70 (0,41)    2,02 (0,36) * 
      51-65     6,02 (0,53) ***  1,37 (0,30) 0,53 (0,41)   0,53 (0,10) ° 1,75 (0,52)        1,12 (0,46) 
   Education (Ref. cat. No higher education)       
      Higher, non-college education 2,98 (0,65) °  2,14 (0,42) °   2,48 (0,02) *   1,24 (0,54) 0,58 (0,59)    0,47 (0,31) * 
      College degree 3,31 (0,62) ° 9,91 (0,38) *** 1,23 (0,59)   0,87 (0,67) 0,87 (0,46)        0,07 (0,33) *** 
   Sex (Ref. cat. Male)       
       Female     1,20 (0,28)  0,61 (0,16) **        0,92 (0,67)  1,14 (0,49)     1,42 (0,31)         1,34 (0,25) 
Constant     0,00 (1,53) ***  0,01 (0,84) ***   0,16 (0,67) ° 0,06 (0,00) ** 0,62 (1,41)     171,79 (1,09) *** 












Note: Odd’s ratios (SE’s) of multiple logistic regressions; ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001
                            BELGIUM       THE NETHERLANDS 
  
 
Figure 3: Qualitative staff distribution 
 




up 34% of parties’ total staff size. This high number of ministerial policy advisors dwarfs the 
capacity of central offices and party groups, who’s limited number of policy advisors cannot cope 
with the activities of their numerous peers at ministerial offices. Although the contrast is less stark, 
ministerial offices also have a communicational advantage compared to central offices. The 
strongest imbalance can be found in Dutch opposition parties, where parliamentary policy experts 
account for 40% of the total staff. Among other important staff categories, however, the human 
resources of central – and parliamentary offices appear on balance (managers, communication 
experts, political assistants). This is clearly not case within Dutch government parties, where the 
balance of human resources is consistently tilted towards parliamentary offices. Within these 
parties, parliamentary offices have a staffing advantage when it comes to managers, policy experts, 
communication experts and political assistants. Although Dutch ministerial offices also include 
political assistants, the size of this group is to limited to tilt the balance of human resources in their 
favor.  
 
While the analysis has largely confirmed the causal mechanism described in the theory section, it 
also shows that this mechanism works differently in Belgium and the Netherlands. The institutional 
become apparent by disaggregating the ‘party in public office’ into parliamentary – and ministerial 
offices. This more fine-grained examination demonstrates how the distribution of parties’ human 
resources is shaped by institutional factors (RQ3). These systemic contrasts are a recurrent element 
in my analyses. Firstly, the quantitative staff distribution (Figure 1) showed that the majority of 
Dutch staffers work within parliamentary offices – regardless of their party’s opposition status. In 
Belgium, however, the balance in a parties’ human resources shifts dramatically when it enters 
government. Whereas the resources of central – and parliamentary offices seem in balance within 
opposition parties, ministerial offices employ the largest share of staffers in government parties. 
Secondly, the relative strength/weakness of party groups within both systems affects the allocation 
of qualified staffers (Table 1). While the Belgian staffers motivated by exerting influence are 
concentrated in ministerial offices, Dutch influence-seekers flock towards parliamentary offices. 
Moreover, public sector experience is particularly high among Belgian ministerial staffers – who 
are known to hop back and forth between civil service positions and cabinets. In contrast, this 
exchange between politics and administration does not appear to affect Dutch political staffers. 
Thirdly, the qualitative distribution of staffers (Figure 2) suggests that the dominant party face 
tends to incorporate the pivotal group of policy experts to maintain its political advantage. While 
the parliamentary party group consistently dominates in the Netherlands, the situation is more 




Belgian opposition parties, ministerial policy experts strongly outnumber other staffers in 
government parties.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined the internal power balance of parties by studying the distribution of their 
human resources. While earlier research suggests that parties’ public offices have a quantitative 
staffing advantage (Krouwel, 2012; Kölln, 2015; Bardi et al., 2017), I have argued that they might 
also enjoy a qualitative staffing advantage. The underlying causal mechanism is driven by forces of 
supply – and demand. Compared to central offices, the demand for experienced, career-oriented 
staffers is higher in parties’ public offices because elected elites seek staffers to help them navigate 
the complexities of daily politics. Such public office positions attract more individuals with high 
professional experience and less partisan motives than the positions at central offices (supply). The 
strong presence of such professional staffers in public offices tilts the internal power balance of 
parties in favor of the ‘party in public office’. As a result, public office staffers operate relatively 
autonomously, as their expertise often puts them one step ahead of their peers at central offices. 
Hence, this qualitative staffing advantage has contributed to the ‘ascendancy of the party in public 
office’ described by Katz and Mair (2002).  
 
The findings demonstrate that parties’ public offices do have a qualitative staffing advantage. First 
of all, central offices include less staffers with typically professional tasks (H1). Indeed, policy 
experts are significantly less prevalent at party headquarters. Surprisingly, the same effect does not 
occur for communication experts who are spread relatively evenly across party faces. Although 
their higher presence at central offices echoes Krouwel’s characterization of contemporary central 
offices as ‘professional campaign vehicles’ (Krouwel, 2012: 244), this contrast with the ‘party in public office’ 
is not significant in the multivariate analysis. As for now, the most distinctive feature of central 
office staff is the dominant presence of party organizers. These findings partially confirm the first 
hypothesis, which stated that policy – and communication experts are more prevalent within the 
party in public office. Second, experienced staffers tend to flock towards parties’ public offices 
(H2). However, only ministerial staffers have significantly more professional experience than their 
peers, more specifically in the public sector. A closer examination of the qualifications of policy 
experts (Appendix C) illustrates that this advantage which is strongly driven by the strong presence 
of policy experts. These findings partially confirm the second hypothesis, which stated that highly 




staffers are more attracted to incentives other than partisanship (H3). Although staffers from all 
party faces are affected by partisan motives, public office staffers are significantly more driven by 
influence and career incentives. Moreover, ministerial staffers are significantly less affected by 
partisan considerations. These findings largely confirm the third hypothesis, which stated that 
staffers driven by influence – and career motives are more prevalent within the party in public 
office. 
 
In conclusion, the findings also illustrate that the experiences and motivations of staffers within 
the ‘party in public office’ are shaped by institutional factors. Despite the recurring dominance of 
parliamentary offices in the Netherlands, it appears that ministerial offices have been particularly 
successful in reaping the benefits of the ascendancy of the ‘party in public office’ in Belgium. Within 
Belgian opposition parties, however, the staffing advantage is far from clear and the human 
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N-VA Belgium Conservative 20% 560 Government 32% November 2018 - January 2019 
CD&V Belgium Christian-Democratic 12% 521 Government 33% December 2018 – March 2019  
PS Belgium Socialist 12% 565 Opposition 29% February 2019 - April 2019 
VLD Belgium Liberal 10% 417 Government 37% December 2018 - March 2019 
Sp.a Belgium Socialist 9% 192 Opposition 34% November 2018 – May 2019 
Groen Belgium Green 5% 91 Opposition 45% January 2019 - March 2019 
PVDA-PTB Belgium Radical Left 4% 65 Opposition 38% January 2019 - April 2019 
Ecolo Belgium Green 3% 104 Opposition 46% March 2019 – April 2019 
Défi Belgium Liberal 2% 103 Opposition 19% March 2019 – April 2019 
VVD Netherlands Liberal 21% 107 Government 51% October 2019 -  December 2019 
D66 Netherlands Liberal 12% 93 Government 47% September 2019 - November 2019 
PvdA Netherlands Socialist 6% 62 Opposition 48% September 2019 - January 2020 
50Plus Netherlands Liberal 3% 27 Opposition 22% October 2019 -  November 2019 
SGP Netherlands Conservative 2% 29 Opposition 48% December 2019 













Note: Young to old. Light gray areas: general distribution, dark gray areas: distribution within party fac 
